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The Responsibility System in
Agriculture







In the post-Mao years, particularly since the Third Plenum
held in December 1978, China has undertaken a series of reforms
in virtually all spheres of political, economic, social, and cultural
life. Of all reforms, the most profound and rapid have been those
in the policies, institutions, and practices in the countryside. In no
other sphere has political control by the upper levels been relaxed
to a greater extent; nowhere have relative autonomy and freedom
in managing economic affairs on the part of the lowest-level units,
the households, and the individual producers been restored more
quickly; and nowhere have the market mechanism and individual
incentives been given a more important place within the overall
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framework of national planning. In no other period since 1955,
including the three years of agricultural crisis, has the Party
Center as a matter of long-term policy accorded households and
individual farmers a greater role.
Moreover, these changes have reflected more directly and
visibly the wishes of the individuals concerned than in most other
fields of social life. They have been the products of a complex
process, combining the flow of influence from the bottom to the
top and from the top to the bottom. This process has included the
official acceptance and then encouragement of many practices
adopted by the peasants themselves but previously concealed
from officials at the higher levels. It has involved much spontaneous
experimentation by peasants and low-level cadres in various
localities. It has not been dominated by a single official or a few
officials at the highest level of the Party. Indeed, it began as an
opposition to the Maoist movement to learn from Dazhai and to
build Dazhai-type counties by a combination of forces: peasants
in many localities; local officials at various levels up to and
including provincial first secretaries (notably those at Anhui and
Sichuan); economists, intellectuals, economic planners, and
officials engaged in agricultural work as well as top party leaders
such as Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun. Despite their shared
opposition to the Maoist model, as might be expected, the
reformers were not of one mind. Some wanted to push change as
far and as rapidly as possible. Others were more concerned with
preserving some basic features of the collective system. Many
ideas and proposals were advanced and debated. Ultimately,
those ideas and proposals which were believed to have produced
concrete results in increasing production and improving the
peasants’ livelihood were adopted. The discovery of new problems
which have emerged in the aftermath of the changes has led to the
search for new solutions and thus to another round of discussions
and debate.
In institutional terms, the central feature of these changes is the
evolution of the system of responsibility for agricultural produc-
tion. This evolution represents not only a change in the method of
labor management but also an adjustment in relations of
production while maintaining the system of collective ownership
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of land and other major means of farm production. It involves the
most significant change in the direction of developments in the
countryside since the beginning of collectivism in 1953, the rapid
drive toward cooperativization in 1955, the communization
movement in 1958, the launching of the movement of learning
from Dazhai in 1964, and the official proclamation in 1975 of the
movement to build &dquo;Dazhai-type counties.&dquo; It may lead to a
change in the system of the commune, at least to the extent of
making it purely a unit of collective economy, while reestablish-
ing a parallel unit for governmental administration at similar
levels. From a larger historical perspective, it can even be said
that the regime has gone as far as it can in readopting some of the
traditional forms of farm practices and relations of production
short of dismantling the system of collective economy established
since 1953.
The adoption and evolution of the system of responsibility for
agricultural production represents the very antithesis of the
movement to learn from Dazhai and to build Dazhai-type
counties. The latter movement was in essence an attempt to
revitalize the commune system and to encourage a trend toward
increasing the size and functions of collective units and minimizing
the role of the individual outside the strictly defined collective
framework. This was a political movement in which political
power and mass mobilization were used to bring about economic
development and equality. In contrast, the responsibility system
seeks to appeal to the economic self-interests of the individual
peasants. Dazhai was held up as a single model for emulation
throughout the nation; now the development of a multitude of
institutional forms and practices which fit the variations in the
Chinese countryside is encouraged. In short, Dazhai as a model
was proclaimed to be applicable everywhere and its &dquo;success&dquo; was
trumpeted loudly. Now the tumult to &dquo;learn from Dazhai&dquo; and to
&dquo;build Dazhai-type counties&dquo; has ended and the Party Center has
sanctioned something very different. This article seeks to give an
account of the evolution of rural policies since 1977 and a
description of the responsibility system. It then looks at how the
recent policies of the Party Center have affected policies, institu-
tions, and practices in Xiyang county and Dazhai brigade on the
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basis of materials gathered during a brief stay in Xiyang county in
August 1980.
ADOPTION OF FOUR BASIC DOCUMENTSCONCERNING AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTccwc~~vG ~c~/c~rt/~~z. D~FL p~wr
In 1977, when outwardly the Dazhai movement reached its
zenith, an undercurrent of opposition was already rapidly
developing. In two meetings in November and December 1977,
opponents stressed the importance of respecting the autonomy of
the team; reorganizing the system of management of the com-
munes, brigades, and teams; correcting &dquo;equal divisionism&dquo; in the
distribution of rewards; reviving the system of awarding work
points according to fixed quotas of work; protecting private
plots; and promoting household sideline occupations. But these
proposals were easily suppressed by the highest authorities in
charge of agriculture, presumably Ji Dengkui and Chen Yonggui
with the support of Hua Guofeng.2 The turning point was marked
by the Third Plenum after a shift in the balance of political forces
had been registered in the victory of the reformers in the debate
over the epistemological postulate that &dquo;practice is the sole
criterion for testing truth.&dquo; That postulate played a prominent
part in undermining the Maoist orthodoxy as it had developed
during the Cultural Revolution, in destroying the &dquo;two whatever-
ism,&dquo; and in paving the way to a reevaluation of the role of Mao in
governing China after 1949.
The Third Plenum agreed to distribute to the lower-level units
for discussion and trial use two decisions: &dquo;Decisions on Some
Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Develop-
ment (Draft)&dquo; and &dquo;Regulations on the Work in Rural People’s
Communes (Draft for Trial Use).&dquo; The first document of 25
articles still reaffirmed the mass movement to learn from Dazhai
and to build Dazhai-type counties. It told the cadres and
peasants to continue to uphold the &dquo;basic experience&dquo; of Dazhai,
but this was now defined merely as the &dquo;revolutionary experience
of self-reliance and hard struggle.&dquo; At the same time, it strongly
urged them to implement firmly the Party’s agricultural and rural
economic policies and to learn from useful experiences at home
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and abroad. It foresaw the emergence of many new models.
Dazhai and all the other advanced units of the nation were told to
recognize their own shortcomings as well as achievements and to
score new successes and create new experiences.
Although the movement to learn from Dazhai was reaffirmed,
many of the Party’s concrete policies on agriculture and the rural
economy as mentioned in the 25 points ran counter to the specific
features of the Dazhai-Xiyang model. Point 3 urged collective
units at all levels to implement the principle of distributing
rewards in proportion to work done and to correct firmly the
mistake of &dquo;equal divisionism.&dquo; It stipulated that &dquo;giving work
points according to fixed work quotas is permitted and giving
work points according to time spent plus appraisal of work done
is permitted.&dquo; Significantly, it added that &dquo;under the prerequisite
of unified accounting and unified distribution by the production
team, [the method of] assigning responsibility for work to work
groups, calculating rewards for work by linking them to yield
[obtained by the work group], and giving bonuses for surpassing
output-quotas [baogong dao zuoye zu, lianxi chanliang jisuan
laodong baochou, shixing chaochan jianglil is also permitted.&dquo;
(Zhonggong yanjiu, May 15, 1979: 154; italics added). 3 Implicitly,
it discouraged the use of the Dazhai method of &dquo;self-assessment
and public discussion&dquo; and the method of &dquo;giving fixed work-
points inflexibly&dquo; to the peasants for putting in a day of work. At
the other extreme, it specifically prohibited assigning responsi-
bility for production to the household [baochan daohu], but this
was to gain approval as one of the major forms of the
responsibility system within two years. It also proscribed the
division of land among households for individual farming
[fentian dangan]. This latter proscription remains in force with
very minor exceptions-for example, in isolated areas in Tibet.
The general and broad provisions in the draft document of 25
articles were not specific enough to guide the development of new
institutions and practices. Almost immediately, they were given
different interpretations by cadres and peasants in different
localities. A debate raged over what was &dquo;also permitted&dquo; under
the phrase, baogong daozu. The narrow interpretation supported
by the editor of Renmin ribao (March 15, 1979:1) in a comment in
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a letter to the editor printed on the front page on March 15, 1979
was that baogong daozu should be construed as the assignment of
responsibility for day-to-day field management to the work
groups but not as identical with baochan daozu (assignment of
responsibility for production to the work groups), accompanied
by the allocation of a specific portion of land, farming implements,
and draft animals to the latter for their use. Baochan daozu
should not be permitted. For under the system of baochan daozu,
many work groups had become in effect &dquo;small teams&dquo; which
took on the character of accounting units, and the team had
degenerated into an empty shell.
The broader interpretation was adopted in Anhui. Under this
interpretation, baochan daozu was considered not essentially
different from baogong daozu. Under the system used in Anhui,
each work group had the authority to use a fixed amount of land
and a fixed number of draft animals and farm implements, but it
did not own them. The teams still made a unified plan for
cultivation and practiced unified distribution of the produce and
cash at the end of the harvest. How this system worked can be
seen in our later discussion of the system used in Zhujiazhuang
work group in Xiyang county.
This interpretation was advanced by an official of the Agricul-
tural Commission of the Anhui provincial government in a letter
to Renmin ribao. Apparently the situation was in flux. At the end
of the month, the editor of Renmin ribao recognized baochan
daozu as one form of the system of linking rewards to yield and
expressed the view that it should be permitted to continue until
the final outcome could be determined. But he still opposed
giving the work groups all, as distinguished from a specified
percentage, of their above target yield as bonuses (Renmin ribao,
March 30, 1979: 1). Even so, the first comment of only a few lines
by the editor aroused widespread fear and uncertainty among
local cadres and peasants that the Party Center was once again
changing its policies and reversing the trend toward liberalization
and relaxation of political control (Renmin ribao, July 2, 1981: 4;
Interview in Chengdu, August 1980)-a fear and uncertainty
which haunted Chinese in all walks of life.
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Anhui scored at least a partial victory over the editor of
Renmin ribao, whose comment presumably reflected the view of
Wang Renzhong, who had replaced Ji Dengkui as the official in
charge of agriculture and who was to be replaced in that position
by Wan Li, the first secretary of Anhui, a year later. Anhui rested
its case on the argument that the peasants in various localities in
the provinces were experimenting with diverse forms of the system
of responsibility and that whether these forms could promote
production could be determined through &dquo;practice,&dquo; thus appeal-
ing to the epistemological postulate as their ultimate justification.
Moreover, that abstract postulate and the whole atmosphere of
relaxation of centralized, upper-level political control legitimized
the frequently concealed practices of the peasants which contra-
vened the official policies on work management. It also encouraged
a measure of spontaneity in the search for forms of organization
and management most suitable to local conditions. In many
cases, these forms were first developed by peasants and lowest-
level cadres behind the backs of higher-level officials and only
later gained the approval of cadres at the county and provincial
levels. Finally, they were sanctioned by the Party Center.
Thus, development of the system of responsibility was partly
the outcome of an unorganized movement from the bottom to the
top. In five districts4 south of the Yellow River and astride the
Huai River in the provinces of Anhui, Henan, and Shandong, the
greater part of the teams adopted the system of baochan daozu in
1979, while a very small part of the teams spontaneously
developed the system of baochan daohu (assignment of responsi-
bility for production to the household) (Renmin ribao, January
23, 1981: 2). As early as 1978, ten teams in one county adopted the
system of da baogan daozu (Renmin ribao, January 28, 1981: 1);
in Fengyang county in Anhui, 83% of the teams adopted this
system in 1979, which we shall discuss later.
When the Fourth Plenum adopted the final version of the
document of 25 articles in September 1979, it deleted the flat
prohibition of baochan daohu. In its stead, it declared that
&dquo;except for certain sideline occupations with special needs and
isolated, single households living in remote hilly areas without
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easy means of transportation, the system of baochan daohu
should ... not be used&dquo; (Renmin ribao, October 6, 1979: 1). It
retained the same language when referring to the assignment of
responsibility for work to work groups. It deleted the statement in
the draft document that &dquo;they [party committees at all levels]
must continue to grasp well the mass movement to learn from
Dazhai and to popularize Dazhai-type counties.&dquo; It merely urged
them to continue to guide the vast number of cadres and peasants
in learning from the &dquo;basic experience&dquo; of Dazhai, which was now
defined in the words of Zhou Enlai rather than the modified
formulation widely used during the Cultural Revolution. This
change represented the formal termination of the movement to
build Dazhai-type counties, after that movement had, for all
practical purposes, ceased some months earlier. All this suggests
that the impulse for the development of new forms of the
responsibility system and their progressive spread came from the
bottom and percolated to the top with the indispensable support
and championship of Party leaders at the national and provincial
levels. As two correspondents of Renmin ribao (July 2, 1981: 5)
put it, the special feature of this development was that &dquo;the
bottom level pushes the upper level and the masses push the
cadres.&dquo;
But one should also not overlook the fact that it was the top
leaders who set the tone for reform and created the atmospheres
which emboldened the peasants to revive-at first stealthily and
later openly-the practices engaged in by some of them in the
three years of agricultural crisis, developed first in the early days
of the cooperativization drive in 1953 and rooted in the rural
tradition. In this atmosphere of reform and relaxation of control,
the peasants and lower-level cadres revived many old practices
and developed new ones in concrete detail, which were then
officially sanctioned by the Party Center in general terms after
a period of debate and experimentation.
The permission given by the Party Center in the finalized
document to baochan daohu as an exception gave a measure of
legitimacy to this form of responsibility system. Its effect was to
encourage the peasants to extend the use of this system in
localities where economic conditions were very poor, where the
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collective system was not functioning well, and where the cadres
gave themselves excessive work points without effectively dis-
charging their duties to the collective and without doing a fair
amount of farm work. As early as 1978, a commune in Yijun
county of Jiangxi adopted the system of baochan daohu for the
day-to-day management of a newly developed wheat field of 4000
mu (Renmin ribao, April 7, 1981: 2). In many counties-for
example, one each in Anhui, Hunan, and Shandong and three
counties in Guizhou-baochan daohu was widely used (Renmin
ribao, November 5, 1980: 2). In 1979 and 1980, more than 70% of
the teams in Funan county of Anhui also adopted it. Many of the
teams in these counties are located not in hilly areas but in the
plains.
Moreover, a system of devolving responsibility to individual
farm workers developed spontaneously, although the teams under
unified management still perform collectively many indispensable
functions for the individual farm workers. The first and most
popularized case was the Mengjiaping team in Shanxi province.
Allegedly created in the spring of 1979 by low-level cadres,
this system was known as &dquo;division of work according to spe-
cialization and assignment of production responsibility to an
individual farm worker.&dquo; In 1979 and 1980, this system, with
some variations, was used in a number of teams in widely
scattered parts of China. We found reports of its existence in
Shaanxi, Liaoning, and northern Jiangsu (Renmin ribao, Novem-
ber 5, 1980: 2, December 13, 1980: 1, December 24, 1980: 2). This
system was gradually perfected and widely popularized in Henan
in 1979 and 1980 under the simplified name of lianchan daolao
(linking production quotas to an individual farm worker). By 1981,
it was used in 55% of the teams there (Renmin ribao, February 24,
1981: 2). Finally, a new form combining elements of the previous
methods developed. This form is known as zhuanye chengbao,
/ianchan jichou (contract work for specialized tasks, calculating
reward by linking it to yield). In sum, it is obvious that peasants
and low-level cadres have taken advantage of the changes in Party
Center policies to develop and extend new forms of the responsi-
bility system which yield greater autonomy and promote local
self-interest.
50
Meanwhile, the Fifth Plenum in February 1980 witnessed not
only an important shift in top personnel but also the most
significant restructuring of organization of the Party Center since
1976. The Secretariat, which had disintegrated during the
Cultural Revolution, was reestablished with Hu Yaobang as
General Secretary; he was to replace Hua Guofeng as Chairman
of the Party 14 months later. Wan Li, the first secretary of Anhui
province, was appointed one of the 11 members of the Secretariat.
He was put in charge of agriculture. In discussing its reestablish-
ment, Ye Jianying described the Secretariat as an organization
which &dquo;stood in the first line [of work] with the Politbureau and
its standing committee in the second line&dquo; (Liaowang, April 20,
1981: 9). There is no doubt that the Secretariat soon became the
most active (usually it meets twice a week) and effective of all
organs in promoting reforms in every sphere. After the reorgani-
zation, the Party Center, with the Secretariat as its prime mover,
took a series of bold steps. These included a proposal to tackle the
economic and political problems of Tibet, a recommendation to
reconstruct Beijing, and exposure of the case of the sinking of an
offshore oil drilling rig.
Insofar as rural policy is concerned, the Center took two big
steps. The first was to launch open criticism of Xiyang county and
its responsible person, Chen Yonggui, which led to his resignation
as Vice-Premier in September. The other was to send top Party
leaders to investigate conditions in the rural areas of several
provinces and to commission more than 100 officials engaged in
rural work, economists, and theoreticians to study typical
localities in ten provincial-level units. These investigations culmi-
nated in a symposium held in mid-September in Beijing and
attended by the first secretaries of all the provinces, cities, and
autonomous regions. The conclusions of this symposium were
summarized in a document known as &dquo;Certain Problems Con-
cerning Further Strengthening and Improvement of the Respon-
sibility System for Agricultural Production.&dquo;6 On September 27,
this summary was sent down by the Party Center as document
number 75 to the Party committees and groups of leading Party
members at the next highest level. This document’s adoption was
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considered by the Beijing Review the sixth of ten major events in
China in 1980.
Document No. 75 approved baochan daohu (including baogan
daohu) as a &dquo;necessary measure&dquo; in developing production and
maintaining links with the masses, not only in remote hilly areas
but also in poor and backward regions. But teams in ordinary
areas where the collective economy was relatively stable, produc-
tion was developing, and the masses were satisfied with the
responsibility system currently in use were still told not to use
baochan daohu. Teams which had already adopted baochan
daohu were allowed to continue it so long as the masses did not
demand a change. As for those communes, brigades, and teams
where economic conditions and management were in the &dquo;middle
range,&dquo; they were directed to use a variety of measures to solve
their problems rather than confine themselves to baochan daohu
alone. The document stressed the merits of zhuanye chengbao,
lianchan jichou, as well as the system of lianchan daolao in day-
to-day field management. Essentially, the Party Center gave its
stamp of approval to the various forms of responsibility system
developed spontaneously in different localities, although it had its
preferences among them. The fundamental spirit underlying the
document was to permit the coexistence of a variety of forms of
responsibility system within one area, one commune, or even one
team and to allow the team the autonomy to choose among them
according to objective conditions and its capacity for managing
collective farm work. Implicitly, it also allowed a team to use one
form of the responsibility system to govern the relationship
between it and its work groups and another form to govern the
relationship between the work group and the individual peasants.
The dispatch of this document downward had the effect of
stabilizing the peasants’ and low-level cadres’ expectations, but it
has not prevented them from further trying various methods to
improve their own livelihood.
On March 30, 1981, the Party Center and the State Council
jointly issued a circular to transmit a document drafted by the
State Agricultural Commission entitled &dquo;a Report Concerning
Vigorous Development of a Diversified Economy in the Rural
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Areas&dquo; (Banyue tan, April 25, 1981: 13-14). Both the circular and
the document insisted there should be no relaxation of efforts to
increase grain production. But their emphasis was clearly on the
importance of developing a diversified rural economy by expand-
ing animal husbandry, fishery, forestry, fruit trees, and many
sideline occupations. For this purpose, it authorized the expan-
sion of private plots (including plots to produce feed and fodder
for animals) up to a maximum of 15% of the total cultivated area
of a team.7 Even more surprising to outside observers, it gave
approval to what the masses called ziliu ren-that is, persons who
do not participate in collective farm work and do not draw grain
rations from the team but who work only on their private plots
and sideline occupations (Banyue tan, April 25, 1981: 14, 20). 8
The explicit permission given to individuals to be ziliu ren, or self-
employed persons, goes one step further in granting greater
freedom to peasants in managing their own economic affairs than
the practice, proscribed under the Dazhai model but adopted
nonetheless by many teams, under which peasants engaged in
transport, handicraft, and similar work in nearby towns and cities
receive their grain ration from the team and in turn pay the team a
fee out of the cash earned. The report and the circular also sought
to promote the development of a diversified rural economy by
adopting new proposals of agronomists and economists. These
documents at once reflect the state of scientific knowledge in
China and urge its use in promoting agricultural development.
A SCHEME FOR CLASSIFYING VARIOUS FORMS OF
THE RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM
All four documents mentioned so far use terms which are not
fully defined and which in practice refer to quite different types of
arrangements. Reports and articles in newspapers and periodicals
are of some help in describing and classifying the variety of forms
included under the rubric of &dquo;responsibility system,&dquo; but unfor-
tunately, not even these sources contain all the information
necessary, nor do they use the terms consistently. Thus, in piecing
together the information from these sources, we sometimes had to
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fall back on our interpretation of the terms used and our
judgment of what the authors meant. A short visit to the villages
provides more detailed and concrete information, but a single
visitor on a hectic trip is likely to miss important bits of
information. Fully realizing all these shortcomings, we have at-
tempted to do our best.
The term &dquo;responsibility system&dquo; (zeren zhi) encompasses a
wide variety of forms.9 What it definitely excludes, at the one
extreme, is the &dquo;self-assessment and public discussion&dquo; method of
awarding work points. It is also distinguishable from the system
of &dquo;fixed [or basic] work points given inflexibly&dquo; to the peasants
for putting in a day of work (sifen siji or difen siji), as well as the
system of basic work points plus flexible appraisal (difen
huoping). These three systems of distributing rewards are believed
ineffective in establishing a direct and visible link between work
and compensation, thus creating a drag on the productivity of the
individual peasant and making management of collective farming
a matter of constantly issuing commands and close supervision.
At the other extreme, division of land for individual farming is
not considered a form of the responsibility system. These two
extremes mark its boundaries.
The various forms of the responsibility system differ according
to the degree to which they directly and effectively link the
individual peasant’s reward and self-interest with his or her work,
though obviously the question of effectiveness must be somewhat
conjectural and subject to further examination. Some of these
forms were developed as far back as the beginning of the
cooperativization movement in 1953. Others were adopted in
some localities at one time or another since the establishment of
the advanced agricultural producers’ cooperatives in 1956-1957.
Still others are new. Some emerged or reemerged spontaneously
at the grass-roots level since 1977 and were later approved by the
authorities at the county, provincial, and national levels.
The forms of the responsibility system can be classified in a
number of ways, but basically they involve two logical compon-
ents. 10 One of these pertains to the way individuals are remuner-
ated for their labor within any relevant group that shares the
responsibility of an assigned task or tasks and where the
54
responsibility is not further devolved to the household or
individual. The second involves the level of assignment of respon-
sibilities for production and the methods for regulating the
assignment and concomitant economic exchanges between the
assigning body (usually the production team and, in a small
number of cases, the brigade) and the relevant responsible group
or party (that is, a single household or an individual).
In reference to the methods of individual remuneration for
labor, the first form to be practiced on a large scale and officially
promoted after Mao’s death was the awarding or scoring of work
points according to fixed work quotas (ding e jigong). For
example, a peasant who transplants rice seedlings in one mu of
land earns a specific number of work points. In many places there
are roughly 300 different quotas for agricultural production
activities. Thus, the &dquo;basic work point&dquo; is eliminated, and &dquo;task-
rate&dquo; is in effect substituted for time worked. 12 This system (also
known as ding e jichou and ding e baogong) was first officially
authorized and sanctioned in Anhui in November 1977, although
it had been used earlier in various parts of China without much
publicity. In a refinement of this system, fixed work quotas can
also be assigned to a series of tasks related to each other at one
time or in a series of steps. This is known as xiaoduan baogong,
ding e jichou. A system of management using one or both of the
methods described above is called management by fixed quotas
(ding e guan li).13 At the end of 1980, this system was used in 50%
of the teams in China for day-to-day field management (Renmin
ribao, December 2, 1980: 3).
The responsibility system implies that production responsi-
bilities can be assigned by a larger collective unit to a smaller
subgroup or party. There are three possible levels of devolution of
responsibilities for production tasks depending on the size of the
subgroup. The first level involves the division of a production
team into work groups. This division makes the collective unit of
responsibility smaller and is an important first step in relating
work performance and rewards more directly (in addition to
reforms in individual labor remuneration procedures), in making
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supervision more intimate and easier, and in ameliorating the
problem of the &dquo;free ride.&dquo;
At this level, there are three subtypes. The first operates in the
following manner. The production team can define for a work
group its task (output quota), the standard of quality of its
produce, and the time limit in which the task is to be completed.
In return, the team gives a specific number of work points to a
work group for the completion of this task according to the
specifications. The work group will distribute the total work
points received to its individual members either by an appraisal of
their work performance or according to the fixed work quota
which they have fulfilled. This subtype is called &dquo;one work group
with four specifications&dquo; (yizu siding).14 Under this system, the
peasants’ reward is linked with output, although still quite
indirectly.1 s
In the second subtype, the relationship between the production
team and its work groups undergoes an important change,
incorporating an element essentially the same as that used in the
system of sanbao yijiang adopted in some of the cooperatives in
the period between 1953 and 1956 and later during the last two
years of agricultural crisis, 1960 and 1961. This element is the
provision of a bonus or a penalty for the overfulfillment or
nonfulfillment of the obligations specified in an agreement or
contract between the team and the work groups. The number and
content of these obligations vary from place to place. A common
form is siding yijiang (four specifications and one bonus).
Under this system, the work group guarantees the fulfillment of
a fixed quota or value of agricultural output at a fixed cost, while
the team assigns a fixed number of workers to the group and
promises to give the group a fixed number of work points. If the
group obtains a higher yield than its output target (presumably
staying within the limit of cost), it will have a bonus; but if it fails
to reach the target, it will have to pay a penalty. The bonus or
penalty is calculated in terms of the percentage of above-target
yield or shortfall, but the percentage given to the work group as a
bonus is usually higher than the percentage of shortfalls paid by
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the work group as a penalty. Bonuses can be as high as 80% or
70%; the penalty can be as low as 20% to 30%. In case of drought
or flood, the penalty is usually waived or reduced, depending on
the seriousness of the natural disaster.
In spite of the division of the team into work groups, the team
remains the basic accounting unit. It adopts a unified production
plan for the whole team. It allocates labor power among the work
groups. It fixes the workday value or the work point value for the
whole team on the basis of the value of agricultural output
(which is handed over by the work groups) after deducting
taxes, expenses, accumulation funds, welfare funds, and other
levies. It gives the bonuses or penalties to each work group by
increasing or decreasing the workday value of the members of
that particular work group. Thus the system of unified distribu-
tion of rewards by the team is preserved. The relationship
between the work group and the individual peasants is governed
by one or the other method of ding e guanli mentioned above, or
both in various combined forms. In some localities, this second
subtype is called assignment of output quotas to each work group
(baochan daozu).16
In the third subtype, all above-target yields belong to the work
group, while all shortfalls must be made good by the group from
its grain reserve and that of its members. It was the use of this
subtype which was disapproved by the editors of Renmin ribao as
late as March 30, 1979.
The fourth subtype, to which the term baochan daozu is also
applied, is more accurately called in some localities &dquo;contract
work in a big way&dquo; or &dquo;assumption of total responsibility&dquo; (da
baogan) by the work group. The most publicized case of a county
using this form is Fengyang, Anhui, which has long been known
for its poverty. In this specific case, a contract is concluded
between a team and each of its work groups. A work group
guarantees to fulfill the production plan, fill the quotas of farm
and sideline products to be sold to the state, and turn over certain
amounts of accumulated funds and other levies to the team. After
having discharged these obligations, the work group retains all
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other produce for distribution among its members. But it must
also make good all shortfalls. Although the team provides
guidelines for the distribution of rewards by the work groups
among the members, unified distribution which obtains in the
second and third subtypes is not practiced.
Fengyang began to use this system in 1978, without the official
sanction of the Party Center but with the support of the Party
secretary of the county. In 1979, 83% of the teams in that county
adopted this system; in 1980, 93% did so (Renmin ribao, January
12, 1981: 4, January 28, 1981: 1). The distribution of rewards by a
work group to its members is still handled either under the system
of appraisal of work done or under the system of rewarding work
points according to fixed work quotas.
Devolving production responsibility to the level of the work
groups below the production team has generally gone by the
designation of baogong daozu or baochan daozu (fixing work or
production responsibility for each work group). It should be
recalled that both the draft document on the acceleration of
agricultural development adopted by the Third Plenum in
December 1978 and the definitive document adopted by the
Fourth Plenum in September 1979 permitted almost as an aside
the adoption of the first two subtypesI7 but were silent on the third
and the fourth. But toward the end of 1980, all four subtypes were
promoted by the authorities and widely used in various parts of
the country.
Baochan daozu represents another step toward a more direct
and effective linkage between an individual peasant’s reward and
self-interest and his or her work. But in various localities, this
linkage is still considered insufficiently direct. Moreover, if team
management is not strong enough, the work groups become in
effect basic accounting units, while the production team loses its
essential functions to the groups.
Hence in some places, the number of teams using the system of
baochan daozu decreases as time goes by, and responsibility is
devolved to still lower levels: the household and individual
(Renmin ribao, March 7, 1981: 2). In Fengyang, Anhui, for
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example, since 1981 responsibility is being further devolved from
the work groups to the households.
In this scheme, production tasks are assigned to the household;
production and payment arrangements are made with it. This is
the second level of the devolution of responsibility. It is known as
the assignment of production responsibility to the household or the
household responsibility system, baochan daohu.I8 There are
three subtypes at this level. Under the first, output quotas for only
specific kinds of produce are assigned to the household. Under
the second, all the land belonging to a team and the output
quotas for all farm produce are assigned to households. In
both of these subtypes, the team still retains its function of
unified accounting and distribution. A system of bonuses and
penalties is used. Under the third, the household retains all its
produce after paying taxes and selling its grain to the state under
the system of unified purchase and after handing over to the team
its share of collective accumulation and welfare funds, as well as
other levies. This is known as assumption of total responsibility
by the household, or household total responsibility system,
baogan daohu, which is also called da baogan but must not be
confused with da baogan by the work group. Da baogan by either
the work group or the household is based on the same principle of
incentive (similar to that contained in the agricultural tax system
that freezes obligations at fixed amounts of produce calculated in
terms of the low yields of the early 1950s): the fixed floor of
obligation is an incentive to produce as much as possible above
that amount. The government recognizes that this subtype seems
to be a step backward from the system used in the advanced
agricultural producers’ cooperatives. But it stresses that this can
bring into play the activism of the peasants and encourage them
to cultivate their land meticulously and obtain greater yields
(Renmin ribao, November 1, 1980: 1). Twenty percent of the
teams throughout China use one of these three subtypes of fixing
output quotas for each household (Renmin ribao, November 5,
1980: 2), a practice which was used in some localities in China
during the three years of agricultural crisis but which was banned
and condemned from 1964 to late 1977 or early 1978.
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Baochan daohu was at first used where the peasant households
belonging to a team are widely scattered in relatively poor hilly
regions. 19 But there has been a tendency for this form to spread to
areas where teams are badly managed or led, peasants are very
poor, and agricultural production stagnant. This tendency has
been not only permitted but even encouraged by the government
in some provinces. As noted earlier, in Funan county in Anhui
province, more than 70% of the teams have adopted this system.
A two-part dispatch in Renmin ribao (January 22, 1981: 2,
January 23, 1981: 2) gave strong endorsement to the widespread
use of this system in five districts in Anhui, Henan, and
Shandong. Through the mouths of the local authorities or in their
own words, three correspondents of the Xinhua news agency
asserted that of all forms of the responsibility system, baochan
daohu establishes the most direct link with the peasants’ interests,
makes their responsibility most concrete, and is the easiest
method to use. For these reasons, it was said to be very appealing
to peasants living under straitened circumstances. It sprang up
spontaneously in 1979 in five districts. In 1980, it spread rapidly
and has become a major form of the responsibility system there.20
Baochan daohu, including da baogan, is now regarded not as a
mere expedient to overcome poverty but as a &dquo;positive measure&dquo;
to promote production (Renmin ribao, August 4, 1981: 2).
In a commune in Jiashan county in this region, some single
households, some groups of three or four households, and some
work groups have used their own savings to purchase walking
tractors (Renmin ribao, December 20, 1980: 1). Thus, this
important and very expensive farm implement used at the lowest
level can now be privately owned. In Guizhou, in 1980 a
production team adopted the system of baochan daozu but
supplemented it with an allocation of some of its land to the
households for production of their grain rations (Renmin ribao,
December 21, 1980: 3). This is termed kouliang tian.
The third level of assignment that has appeared in recent
experiments with the responsibility system is the fixing of output
quotas for an individual farm worker, baochan daolao. An
example of this form was given in Renmin ribao and has been
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mentioned in passing above. The Mengjiaping team in Shanxi
had only 16 households, and a population of 64, including 12
male and 8 female farm workers. Its 310 mu of cultivated land
were divided in 1979 into eight parts. Eight experienced male
farm workers were selected and each was assigned to cultivate one
of the eight parts of land under a contract. Each of the eight farm
workers was obligated to produce 6,500 jin of grain for the
collective (that is, 168 jin per mu). Everything produced above
this quota belonged to him, but he also had to make up for all
shortfalls from his private reserve (Renmin ribao, September 28,
1980, October 13, 1980: 1).21 The remaining farm workers were
assigned other kinds of specific jobs such as raising goats and
basic farmland construction.
The system of baochan daolao has been further refined,
specified, and developed into lianchan daolao. A description of
this system was given in Renmin ribao. Of the 370,000 teams in
Henan, about 60% have adopted this system (Renmin ribao,
February 24, 1981: 2, March 7, 1981: 2; article by commentator,
March 2, 1981: 1). According to these reports, this system has a
dual advantage. On the one hand, it preserves the integrity of the
team as the basic accounting unit, without any division into work
groups. On the other hand, it links the individual peasant’s
reward most directly and effectively to his or her work. The team
undertakes unified planning, unified tilling of the land, unified
investment, and unified allocation and employment of labor,
draft animals, and farm machinery and tools of large and medium
sizes. All farm tasks that are not easy for the individual peasant to
do are done by the team, which organizes persons with specialized
skills or small groups to undertake these tasks, which include
ploughing, harrowing, raking the soil, building ridges for vege-
table gardens, sowing, irrigating the fields, insect control, nursing
seedlings, and basic farmland construction. The daily manage-
ment of the fields throughout the year is assigned to individual
farm workers. Each is held responsible for managing a specific
sector of the land for one to three years. The worker is obligated
to fulfill a production quota, which is generally fixed on the basis
of the output of the last year prior to the implementation of this
system. The peasant is provided with a fixed amount of chemical
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fertilizer, insecticides, seeds, and other material inputs and is
given a fixed number of work points for the accomplishment of
the assigned tasks. But there is also a provision for bonuses for
overfulfillment of the production quota and penalties for nonful-
fillment. The system under which the farm worker receives a
bonus equal to all the above-quota yield and pays the full penalty
for the shortfall has gradually replaced the system under which he
or she receives a bonus equal to a proportion of the above-quota
yield and pays a penalty equivalent to only a proportion of the
shortfall. In case of natural disaster, bonuses and penalties are
calculated in terms of production quotas readjusted according to
the seriousness of the loss. This system has been clarified and
stablized after the Party Center’s directive on the responsibility
system in rural areas was sent down in September 1980. An
important article by the commentator of Renmin ribao suggests
that this system is most suitable for those communes and teams
which are neither very poor nor very rich (Renmin ribao, March
2, 1981: 1).22
In Tibet alone peasants in isolated areas who are confronted
with great difficulties are officially permitted to &dquo;go it alone&dquo; (dan
gan). Under this subtype, an individual household has no obliga-
tion toward the collective unit. It owns its means of production
and bears the responsibility for its own profits and losses (Renmin
ribao, November 15, 1980: 1).
As we move down the levels of the responsibility system,
beginning with those teams which still manage production and
pay workers according to the task rate or &dquo;ding e&dquo; system, to the
various subtypes of work group responsibility, then to the
level of the household, and finally to the level of the individual
worker, the linkage between individual effort and reward would
appear to be progressively more direct and visible. (This point is
somewhat obscured at the household level, since household
management of internal work and pay relations becomes a more
private matter; the link between individuals within the household
and household management of the responsibility system needs
further examination.) In addition, the subject of responsibility
moves from the team to the individual at the lowest level, and the
peasant’s planning initiative and individual incentives are more
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heavily relied upon. But there is the risk of weakening the collective
unit and neglecting collective undertakings, including water
conservancy and public welfare. In extreme cases, there is the
danger of simply dividing the land and collectively owned
machinery and tools among the households. These problems are
noted in the press. Measures have been undertaken to solve them,
as in the case of the system used in Henan.
There remains one version of the responsibility system which
cuts across the logical scheme described above, since it involves
specialized work that is available for assignment to any of the
three levels mentioned above, utilizing a contract system involving
rewards and penalties. This system is known as zhuanye cheng-
bao, lianchan jichou (contract work for specialized tasks, calcu-
lating reward by linking it to yield). Under this system, special
tasks in farming, forestry, animal tending and husbandry, fishery
sideline production, and industry and commerce that require
specialized skills are assigned to a special work group, a house-
hold, or an individual. Thus, work groups, households, and
individual farm workers specializing in one task frequently
coexist within a team. A contract is concluded between them and
the team with provisions for bonuses for exceeding the con-
tractual obligations and penalties for failure to meet them. A
simple example of this system is the assignment of milk pro-
duction by several cows to a household. In more economically
developed areas, there is a tendency for teams to make the tran-
sition from using the system of contract work for a small number
of related tasks to the system of zhuanye chengbao, lianchan
jichou (Renmin ribao, March 2, 1981: 1).23 A specialized task is
assigned or a contract is awarded to a group, household, or an
individual by two different methods. One is self-nomination and
public discussion, the other competitive bidding. Recently, the
merits of the second method have been stressed in the press.
The document on the responsibility system issued in September
1980 gave zhuanye chengbao, lianchan jichou high praise and
compared it favorably with other forms of production contract
system on the following grounds: It satisfies the commune
member’s demand for linking reward to yield; it stabilizes the
primary economic position of the team; it integrates in concrete
63
terms the promotion of the individual commune member’s
activism in production with the development of the superior
characteristics of unified management, division of labor, and
cooperation; it facilitates the development of a diversified
economy, the extension of scientific farming, and the promotion
of commodity production; and it eases the task of the members in
taking care of sideline occupations (Banyue tan, April 25, 1981:
7). This form may be used in economically distressed areas and
then developed into a more socialized division of labor among
specialized tasks as the forces of production grow and the number
of products increases (Banyue tan, April 25, 1981: 7; Zhan Wu
and Wang Guichen, 1981: 55-59, 73).
In such work as basic farmland construction and water
conservancy projects, a system of individual remuneration some-
times considered marginal to the responsibility system is still
frequently used. This is the system of pinggong jifen. Sometimes,
even difen huoping is used. There are attempts to use the ding e
system in this kind of work. But the systems of difen siji and &dquo;self-
assessment and public discussion&dquo; (zibao gongyi) are vigorously
attacked as contributing to low labor productivity and difficulties
in labor management.
The logical scheme we use also reveals roughly the progression
of the responsibility system as it gained the approval of the Party
Center and was promoted in the countryside. This trend was
described by the officials of the Agricultural Commission of
Henan province in terms of &dquo;eight breakthroughs&dquo; or, to be more
precise, eight transformations: (1) from the absence of linkage
between reward and yield to the establishment of this linkage; (2)
from linkage between reward and yield for work groups to
linkage for individual farm workers or households; (3) from
linkage between reward and yield in the production of industrial
crops to grain production; (4) from linkage between reward and
yield in growing autumn grain crops to growing summer grain
crops; (5) from linkage between reward and yield in agriculture to
linkage in forestry, animal husbandry, sideline occupations,
fishery, and so on; (6) from proportionate bonuses and penalties
to full bonuses and full penalties; (7) from the adoption of the
system by ordinary communes, brigades, and teams to adoption
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by those with a higher level of production; and, finally, (8) from
fixing the production targets for one year to several years without
change (Renmin ribao, July 2, 1981: 5). But despite this general
trend, the main point emphasized is still that a team should adopt
a form most suitable to its economic conditions and capability for
management.
From our point of view, the seventh &dquo;breakthrough&dquo; is of
utmost significance. It reveals to us how complete is the reversal
of the Maoist agricultural policies adopted during the Cultural
Revolution. It reflects the reformers’ view that the responsibility
system can achieve better results even in localities where the
implementation of Maoist policies had increased production and
improved the peasants’ livelihood. This seventh &dquo;breakthrough&dquo;
is forcefully illustrated by a brigade in Sichuan, well known for
the strength of its collective economy. Until the end of 1980, all
farming activities as well as industrial and sideline production
had been under the direct, unified management of the brigade.
For farming, the brigade had not been divided into teams or work
groups, and no strict system of responsibility had been used. Still
the per capita income distributed by the brigade to its members
had reached Y318 in 1980, as compared with the national average
of Y85.9. Seventy percent of its total income came from the
profits of industrial and sideline enterprises, which had been
highly developed. But according to reports, the high profits
covered up the inefficiency in the use of labor not only in farming
activities but also in industrial and sideline production. After the
autumn harvest, the brigade adopted the system of zhuanye
chengbao, lianchan jichou. It assigned two-thirds of its members
to fixed, specific posts in its 14 industrial and sideline enterprises.
It gave each of its enterprises, their small groups or their
individual workers a planned target of output value. The work
points earned by each worker were decided on the basis of output
value and the cost of the product with bonuses for surpassing the
target and penalties for failing to meet it. For field management of
farm work, it divided the remaining one-third of its members into
seven fixed work groups. As a result, the harvesting of wheat and
other produce in spring was allegedly accomplished in half a
month without the customary help of 80 to 90 persons hired from
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other places. In the first four months, the net income of the
industrial and sideline enterprises increased more than 56%
(Renmin ribao, July 3, 1981: 2).
Several other new developments deserve to be mentioned
briefly. In some places where baochan daohu was practiced, three
to more than ten households voluntarily joined together to
purchase farm machinery, to undertake irrigation projects, or to
set up small work shops to process farm products. In a small
number of cases, several households joined a brigade or team to
form an economic enterprise, to which each individual would
contribute an equal amount of money as his or her share and the
brigade or team would put up the collectively owned land. These
enterprises amass their own capital, produce and sell their own
products, bear the responsibility for their own profits and losses,
select their own personnel, and adopt their own management
systems (Renmin ribao, July 17, 1981: 4, April 28, 1981 : 1, March
21, 1981: 2, March 18, 1981: 1).
The system of responsibility has been extended to the cadres as
an experiment. In one county in Ningxia, the Party committee
signed contracts with cadres in the communes, brigades, and
teams to specify their personal responsibilities with provisions for
bonuses and penalties. For example, a contract concluded
between the county and a commune used as the base line the
averages of total grain production, total amount of grain sold
to the state, and income from industrial and sideline production
in the past three years. If the commune increased total grain
production and grain sold by 10,000 catties or its income from
industrial and sideline production by Y 10,000, the county would
give the cadres of the commune a bonus of a specified amount. If
there was a decrease by 10,000 catties or ~10,000, the county
would deduct from the salaries of the commune cadres a specified
amount as penalties. This system was used in 1980 in all 71
brigades and their 564 teams in that county. In settling the account
for that year, the cadres in 30 teams received penalties, while those
in all other teams were given bonuses of varying amounts
(Renmin ribao, February 17, 1981).24 In Guangdong, an association
of scientific workers and its local affiliates signed contracts with
three backward teams to popularize an improved method of
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farming. Under the contract, 5% of the increase would belong to
the team. Everything above 5% would be divided equally between
the two contract parties. Ten percent of the receipts of the asso-
ciation and its local affiliates would be used as bonuses for
agricultural technicians who were stationed in these teams. If
there was a decrease in production not due to natural disaster, the
association would compensate the teams for their losses (Renmin
ribao, April 12, 1981: 2). In the suburban area of Beijing, 240
contracts between scientific units on the one hand and commune
or peasant households on the other were signed in the first seven
months of 1981 (Dagong bao, August 4, 1981: 1).
The numerous forms of the responsibility system must have
been bewildering even to the cadres and the peasants of China,
not to say outside observers. In January 1981, Chinese leaders
begun to sum up, simplify, and systematize their views on the
responsibility system. In this summation, two trends in the
development of the responsibility system are discernible, aside
from those mentioned above. The most important is that increas-
ing stress has been placed on three principal forms of the system
of responsibility system with reward-yield linkage: (1) baochan
daohu (household responsibility system) and da baogan (house-
hold total responsibility system), (2) tongyi jingying, lianchan
daolao (unified management [combined with] linkage of the
individual worker’s reward to yield), and (3) zhuanye chengbao,
lianxi chanliang jichou (contract work, for specialized tasks
[combined with] calculation of rewards by linking them to yields).
These three forms are said to fit respectively three different types
of localities: (1) economically backward and hard-pressed areas,
(2) areas at the middle range of economic conditions, and (3)
areas where economic conditions are good and the collective
economy is relatively strong. The second trend is that increasing
efforts are being made to preserve the collective economy when
the first and second forms are used. Even under the household
total responsibility system, the production team must-it was
stressed in one case-undertake unified planning for cultivation,
unified plowing and sowing, and unified irrigating. When the
system of linking the individual worker’s reward to yield is used, it
is specified that the systems of collective ownership, of unified
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distribution, and of using the team or brigade as the basic
accounting unit should not be changed, and that planning for
cultivation, plowing, use and control of water, and the care and
use of draft animals and agricultural machinery and implements
of large and medium sizes should be undertaken under the unified
auspice of the team or brigade.2s
Our classificatory scheme, the cases used as illustrations, and
our discussion of the trends and processes are all based on official
reports which undoubtedly try to justify the responsibility system
in terms of the demands, interests, and practices of the masses. At
this moment we are not in a position to determine how correctly
and accurately these reports reflect the real situation. But given
our knowledge of the traditional practices of the peasants and the
measures adopted during the three years of agricultural crisis,
these reports cannot be totally misleading and deceptive. At the
very least, they represent the views of the reforms and the policies
of those in charge of agriculture. A few years hence, we shall be in
a better position to judge the credibility of these reports, the
validity of these views, and the success or failure of these policies.
ADOPTION OF THE SYSTEM OF RESPONSIBILITY
IN XIYANG AND DAZHAI SINCE 1979
As we suggested in the first section, the peasants and lowest-
level cadres, in response to the change in the political atmosphere
at the national summit, played a visible role in spontaneously
developing various forms of the responsibility system; and the
adoption of that system as a national policy was the product of
interaction of impulses from the top to the bottom and from the
bottom to the top. In contrast, the adoption of the responsibility
system in Xiyang and Dazhai accompanied the downgrading and
then the termination by the Party Center of the movement to
learn from Dazhai and to build Dazhai-type counties and the
publication of a series of self-criticisms made by Party committees
of the county, district, and province since July 1978. This was
clearly the product of the change in national policy and the effort
of officials at all levels in Xiyang to &dquo;keep in step with the
Party&dquo;-an effort which was opposed by Chen Yonggui. Within a
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week after the Fourth Plenum, and even before the official
publication of &dquo;Decision on Certain Problems Concerning the
Acceleration of Agricultural Development,&dquo; Renmin ribao re-
ported on October 3 (1979: 2) that a series of nine decisions had
been made by the Xiyang Party committee in meetings held since
August, when it had applied the criterion for testing truth in
examining the ultra-leftist errors committed in the movement to
learn from Dazhai. For our purposes, the most important
decision was that the whole country should rigorously adopt the
system of management by fixed work quotas and that the system
of dividing a production brigade or team into work groups,
assigning responsibility for work to the latter, and calculating
rewards by linking them to yield should also be implemented.
Thus, belatedly and just before the Fourth Plenum was to adopt
an even more liberal version of the draft of December 22, 1978 as
the definitive statement of policy (Renmin ribao, October 3, 1979:
6-13),26 the Xiyang party committee fell into line. The Party
branch of Dazhai indicated that it &dquo;would also implement the
system of management by fixed quotas.&dquo; But it did not mention
adoption of the system of assigning responsibility for work to
work groups and calculating rewards by linking them to yield.
In 1979, all the brigades in Xiyang used a system of fixed
quotas for at least part of their farm work, locally called ding e
baogong. For the autumn harvest, the deputy leader of the
Dazhai brigade, Jia Changsuo, allegedly with the support of the
cadres and members there, took charge in experimenting with the
system of ding e baogong, which the Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Service (April 14, 1981: R4) called &dquo;contract work&dquo; and
the Dagong bao (May 8, 1981: 1) called baogong shengchan
zeren zhi. As a result, the peasants of Dazhai spent ten days
less than in former years to complete the harvest. Moreover,
Dazhai was able to dispense with the help which had been given in
the past by employees from the county seat (Interview in Dazhai,
August 1980). When Chen Yonggui returned from Beijing, he
dismissed Jia. But Chen himself was in turn dismissed as the
secretary of the Xiyang Party committee in December and
replaced by Liu Shugang, who for many years had been a deputy
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secretary in charge of industry. Li Xishen, the deputy secretary
who had taken overall charge of running the county in the
absence of Chen from Xiyang, was assigned only the task of
handling finance and trade (Interview in Xiyang, August 1980).
He was dismissed as a deputy secretary in the spring of 1980. In
late June, Guo Fenglian, secretary of the Dazhai Party branch,
was transferred to work at the county seat as a cadre of twenty-
third grade at a monthly salary of Y47.5, with her specific job
assignment to be determined at a later date. The Party committee
of the Jinzhong district, which has jurisdiction over Xiyang, was
also reorganized. Chen himself was to resign from his position as
a vice-premier in September.
At the time of Tsou’s visit to Xiyang county in August 1980,
there were 419 brigades, four more than in 1979 and eight more
than in 1976. With a few exceptions, all the brigades are divided
into several teams which are roughly equivalent in function to the
work groups described in the above scheme for the whole nation.
With few exceptions, the brigades, not the teams, remain the basic
accounting units. As Mr. Liu said, the brigades in Xiyang are
~ 
relatively small, and the primary problem is implementing the
system of production responsibility. Hence, at that time the
county did not plan to make the team the basic unit of account.
For large brigades, the teams are further divided into work
groups. Of the 419 brigades, 247 brigades (59%) adopted in 1980
the system of siding yijiang, under which each brigade assigns to
its teams a fixed amount of land and labor on the one hand and a
fixed target of yields in both quantity and quality and a target of
investment or cost on the other, with provision for a bonus of
40%, 60%, 70%, or 80% of above-quota yields and a penalty of
40%, 30%, or 20% of shortfalls. Thirty-five brigades (8%) have
adopted the system under which all above target yields will belong
to their teams or work groups. This system is the same as the third
subtype of baochan daozu in our scheme of classification,
although in Xiyang this mainly takes the form of baochan daodui
(team). But in the interviews, the cadres called this system da
baogan, an unavoidable confusion due to the lack of a standard
terminology used uniformly throughout China. Twenty-four
70
percent (101) of the brigades have adopted a system of linking the
yields of the teams to the work points given by the brigade to the
teams. For example, a team will be given ten work points for
producing a certain amount of grain. Thirty-six brigades (9%)
have adopted a system under which the team will hand over to the
brigade a fixed amount of its profits, its share of public welfare
funds, its share of grain reserves, and a certain amount of grain
for special use by the brigade. After having discharged these
duties, the team keeps all its produce.27 This system is called
elsewhere and in our classification da baogan daozu or, in the case
of Xiyang, should be called da baogan daodui. In giving Tsou
these figures, the local officials used the brigades as units. The
meaning of these figures is ambiguous. It may mean that in a
certain brigade under one of the four categories, all the teams
maintain the stipulated relationship with the brigade. Or it may
mean that only a majority or plurality of the teams do so.
The various brigades also have specialized work groups and
specialized households for such tasks as forestry, coal mining,
and raising oxen. The county authorities hope that in a few years
30% of the rural population will become members of specialized
households or specialized work groups. They also plan to open up
the mountain slopes to the peasants, to give each peasant a
number of mu, and to allow him or her to keep whatever can be
produced.
The division of the brigade into teams began in 1979 after the
draft document adopted by the Third Plenum in December 1978
had been sent down. Of the eight brigades visited in 1980, seven
were divided into production teams and used the system of siding
yijiang, which was conceded by the cadres to be essentially the
same as the once-condemned system of sanbao yijiang. Dazhai
did not adopt the system until early 1980. The eighth brigade,
Gaojialing, was a small village with 306 persons and served also as
the site of the experimental farm for Dazhai commune. It was not
divided into teams even in 1980, nor were four other small
brigades in Dazhai commune.
Interviews with the leading cadres in all three other communes
visited-Gaoluo, Sandu, and Lijiazhuang-suggest that a major-
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ity of the brigades there have been divided into teams and used the
system of siding yijiang in their relations with the teams. For the
purpose of illustration, let us give a more detailed account of three
brigades-Wujiaping, Qingyendi (in Gaoluo commune), and
Dazhai-which are different from each other in some respects.
Wujiaping is a large brigade with a population of 1,315. In 1979,
the brigade decided to set up seven specialized work groups
totalling 77 persons for coal mining, forestry, brick making,
manufacturing explosives, operating tractors and other machin-
ery, raising vegetables, and raising pigs. The rest of the popula-
tion was grouped into four production teams for farming, each
with approximately 300 persons including more than 40 male and
female full-time and part-time workers. Teams were further
subdivided into work groups with about 15 farm workers each. In
describing the relationship between the brigade and the four
teams, the leading cadres in Wujiaping openly called it by its old
name, sanbao yijiang (three guarantees and one bonus-that is, a
labor-production-cost contract with rewards and penalties) and si
guding (&dquo;four fixed specifications&dquo;-that is, fixed quantities of
land, labor, draft animals, and farm tools assigned by the brigade
for use of the teams) (Interview in Xiyang, August 1980). If a team
obtains a yield above the agreed target of production, 40% of the
above-quota yield will be retained by the team and 60% will be
handed over to the brigade. This stands in contrast to the system
used from 1966 to 1978 under which all produce had to be given to
the brigade for unified distribution. The team assigns work
quotas to the work group and a specific number of work points
for their fulfillment. There is no provision for bonuses or
penalties. In turn, the work group assigns work quotas with
attached work points to the individual peasants. For some
agricultural work, such as farmland construction, to which this
method is difficult to apply, the system of awarding work points
after appraising work performance is used instead of the system
of work quotas. This appraisal is not done by self-assessment
and public discussion, and political consciousness is no longer
taken into account. It takes place within the team, not the
brigade, in a meeting attended by team members.
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At the end of 1979, the workday value for the whole Wujiaping
brigade before awarding bonuses and imposing penalties was set
at Y1.60. Table 1 shows how the system of bonuses and penalties
worked. It shows that all of the bonus was distributed to the
farm workers through increases in the workday value. (For
example, in the second team the Y760 bonus divided by 15,030
workdays comes to almost exactly Y.05, which added to the
base workday value for the brigade of Y1.60, results in the
team’s workday value of Y1.65.) Despite this direct connec-
tion between bonus and remuneration, the system of fixed
targets with bonuses and penalties does not seem to have
provided a significant new incentive for greater effort in produc-
tion. Total grain production in Wujiaping increased 6.4% in 1979
over 1978, but this is largely attributable to very good weather
and to the fact that 1978 was not a particularly good year (itself
only 2.4% over 1977). The brigade’s base workday value of¥1.60
in 1979 was only 14% above the 1978 figure of Y 1.40, despite the
fact that the state procurement price for grain had risen by 20% in
1979. The inequality among the teams in distributed income (as
measured by the workday value) occasioned by the new responsi-
bility system was marginal, though it may have stood as a
warning for the future to teams which do not raise produc-
tion commensurate with other teams. The evidence suggests,
in short, that either because of its novelty or its specific features
(or some combination of both), the system of fixed work targets
with bonuses and penalties did not do much to spur incentives
and production in its first year of operation in Wujiaping brigade.
Thus, the cadres of the brigade were considering two alterna-
tives for 1981. The first was to replace the present system with the
system locally called da baogan, under which all above-target
yields would be retained by the team. This would be a rather
drastic measure for Wujiaping. The second was to apply the
present system to regulate the relationship between the work
groups and the team. As the work group was one-third the size
of the team, the linkage between the efforts of the individual
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In other words, the guiding idea that the peasants must be given
greater material incentives would be pushed one step further.
The second case was cited by top county officials as a sterling
example of their success in implementing the new system and of
the virtue of making the units in the responsibility system as small
as possible without destroying the brigade as an accounting unit.
Qingyendi brigade in Gaoluo commune had a population of 530
in 1980, which was slightly larger than that of Dazhai (which had
a population of 470). But it had 1,374 mu of cultivated land, while
Dazhai had only 846 mu. In 1979, the system of siding yijiang was
implemented to govern the relationship between the brigade and
the two teams plus one work group into which the brigade was
divided. The work group consisted of only five households with
28 persons, five male farm workers, and four female farm
workers. The members of all the households are kin and share the
surname of Zhu. The male heads of three of the five households
are brothers. All five households live close together in a small
hollow some distance from the highway. This natural unit, known
traditionally as Zhujiazhuang, is surrounded by 137 mu of
terraced fields, which are separated by topographic features from
the fields cultivated by other teams. These 137 mu of land were
assigned by the brigade to be cultivated by these five households.
Thus the cultivated land per person amounted to 4.9 mu, in
comparison with the average of 2.4 mu per person for the other
two teams. In 1979, Zhujiazhuang obtained a yield of 103,483 jin
of grain in comparison with 70,000 jin in 1978 (a year of bad
weather) and 90,000 jin in 1975.
Table 2 summarizes the 1979 targets and final outcome of the
&dquo;four specifications&dquo; in Zhujiazhuang. On the basis of these
figures, Zhujiazhuang was to receive a bonus, but in a two-step
fashion, the first based on a preliminary estimated income of
Y9487.10, which surpassed the income target of Y8,207.00 by
Yl,280.10. This surplus of ~1,280.10 was added to the value of
saved labor of Y849.80, from which the cost overrun of Y465.60
was subtracted, producing a net surplus of Yl,664.30. Under the
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receive 60% of this, or Y998.58, as a bonus; this figure in turn
amounted to Y.371 for each of the 2,693 labor days put in by the
peasants in Zhujiazhuang. This pushed the workday value from
the brigade base of Y1.40 to Y 1.771. The second stage of the
bonus calculation began from the fact that Zhujiazhuang’s actual
income for 1979 turned out to be YI0,579.29, which was
Y1,092.19 in excess of the preliminary estimate ofY9,487.10. Of
this extra surplus, 60% was Y655.31, which added another Y.243
to the value of each of the 2,693 labor days, bringing the total
workday value to Y2.014. (For reasons which remain unclear to
us, but which probably have to do with the delay in the
calculation of the actual gross income figure, the Y.243 had not
yet been distributed at the time Zhujiazhuang was visited: this
amount was still due from the brigade.) In contrast, the final
bonuses for the first and second teams of the brigade were Y.01
and Y.02, respectively. County authorities had decided to reward
further Zhujiazhuang’s strong efforts by building a power line to
supply it with electricity; the peasants there were talking about
purchasing television sets.
Though we cannot answer it fully, we can now pose the
question of the success of the new responsibility system (at least in
terms of the stated goal of spurring production) in Zhujiazhuang
compared with the other two teams in Qingyandi brigade as well
as with Wujiaping brigade. The differences were probably related
to the differences in settlement patterns, especially that Zhujia-
zhuang, an isolated grouping of only five households, is far smaller
and more compact than the teams in the Qingyandi or Wujiaping
brigades. One goal of the new policies on rural organization and
management is to increase the directness of link between effort
and reward by reducing the size of the collective units. Such
smaller units are far better suited to the historical context and
human-geographic environment of Zhujiazhuang. The contrast
with Wujiaping may also have something to do with the relatively
higher level of collective institutions, practices, and social
relations there; Wujiaping was, after all, the first brigade in
Xiyang to emulate Dazhai.
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At the end of 1979, Dazhai fell into line and proceeded to divide
into production teams. According to one cadre in Dazhai, even
Chen Yonggui agreed with the plan. In March 1980, the
arrangement was completed. The brigade was divided into three
teams with an equal number of farm workers of equal capacity for
work on each team. All brigade members were first classified into
groups according to the basic work points they had earned for
each day of work in 1979, ranging from 5.5 to 10 work points.
They were assigned to one of the three teams by lot. Three young
peasants, aged 27, 32, and 37, were selected among seven
candidates as heads of the teams. One of the three had served as
head of the agricultural science section for several years. He and
another team leader are Party members, while the third is not.
Meanwhile, the revolutionary committee had been reorganized
into a management committee of 13 members. A young man in
his 30s, who was a candidate for Party membership and who was
therefore not a member of the Party branch, was selected as the
head of the brigade, replacing Liang Bianliang, who as a 16-year-
old boy had joined Chen’s first mutual aid team in 1946 and
who was now 50 years old and not in the best of health. But the
Party branch had not been reorganized at the time.
The system of &dquo;four specifications and one bonus&dquo; (siding
yijiang) was adopted to govern the relationship between the
brigade and the teams. In addition, specialized work groups were
set up under the direct supervision of the brigade to handle
forestry, animal husbandry, vegetable gardens, and sideline
production. Over 70 male and female farm workers were assigned
to these specialized work groups; the remaining 120 farm workers
were divided among the three production teams-a system
which had been used at one time or another before 1960. Although
the reestablishment of a system eliminated 20 years ago was
the result of the decision to keep in step with the Party Center,
several cadres in Dazhai-particularly those directly responsible
for production-conceded that this revived system made labor
management easier because of the reduction in the size of the
management unit and the more obvious linkage between reward
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and the work done. A team is now managed by a team leader, a
deputy team leader, and four work point recorders.
As for the method by which the team pays the peasants for
work done, Dazhai cadres still find the system of payment by
fixed work quotas (which had been abolished for all farm work in
1963) difficult to implement, although they have now readopted it
for several kinds of farm work-for example, hoeing, applying
fertilizer, and harvesting. But for a majority of farm work, the
system of granting work points after appraising work performance
continues to be used. The basic work points for a peasant were
still to be decided once a year, but in a meeting of the members of
the team rather than the brigade. In describing this system, the
cadres gave the impression that it was essentially the system of
&dquo;fixed [basic] work points [for a person] plus flexible appraisal [of
work done]&dquo; (sifen huoping). But the system of self-assessment
and public discussion using political consciousness as one of the
four criteria for determining work points was definitely abandoned
after it had been applied to all kinds of farm work for 17 years.
Dazhai cadres recognized that they had to implement the
principle of distributing income according to work done, as
decreed by the Party Center. But they did see the negative
implications of the new system of fixed work quotas and of
appraising work performance. They noted that households
without adequate labor power and old, sick, weak, and crippled
peasants would be adversely affected, although they themselves
would have a higher income at the end of the year. It is clear that
the original system had enjoyed strong support among the
peasants in Dazhai and that even those with physical strength and
technical skills had internalized the attitude of looking at the
interests of the village as a whole rather than considering their
own self-interests exclusively. In contrast to Dazhai, all the other
brigades and communes visited used the system of giving work
points according to fixed work quotas in a majority of farm work.
In Dongyetou and Lijiazhuang commune, it was applied to 80%
of all farm work. In Sandu brigade, the system of giving work
points after an appraisal of work done (pinggong jifen) was
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replaced completely by the system of giving work points according
to fixed work quotas (ding e jigong) and another system which
involved the use of work quotas plus bonuses and penalties.
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EQUALITY
IN XIYANG SINCE 1976
What had happened in Xiyang county between 1976, the year
in which the movement to build Dazhai-type counties was in full
swing, and 1979, the first year in which the movement was in full
retreat and many changes in institutions and practices took place?
Tables 3 and 4, the raw data of which were supplied by county
authorities in 1977 and 1980, give a schematic picture of the
increase in workday values and the growth in income in all
brigades. Lorenz curves constructed from these tables and
presented here are intended to provide a visual image. Together,
they also suggest some tantalizing questions about the problem of
equality within the county.
Tables 3 and 4 show that the average of the workday values of
all Xiyang brigades increased from Yl. 18 in 1976 to Y 1. 31 in 1979
(an average annual rate of 3.5%), while average collectively
distributed income per capita increased from Y105 to Y125 over
the same period (an average annual rate of 6%). But the weather
in 1979 was unusually good. In 1979, the state increased the
procurement prices by 20% for grain sold within the quotas set by
the state and an additional 50% for above-quota grain. Moreover,
the state set the quota for unified purchase for the whole nation at
5,000,000,000 jin less than in 1978. In Dazhai, this policy lowered
the quota for unified purchase from 160,000 jin to 120,000 jin,
which had the effect of increasing the proportion of grain pur-
chased at the higher above-quota price. Dazhai sold the state
600,000 jin, with 480,000 jin at above-quota prices. The county
average of Y 131 of per capita collectively distributed income is far
above the national average of Y83.4 (Renmin ribao, May 1, 1980:
4), the average for Sichuan of Y80.1, and the average ofY96.1 for











































Figure 1: Lorenz Curve of Category Distribution of Workday Values in All Brigades
of Xiyang County, 1976
Figure 2: Lorenz Curve of Category Distribution of Workday Values in All Brigades
of Xiyang County, 1979
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TABLE 4
Distribution of Average Annual Per Capita Collectively Distributed
Income in All Brigades in Xiyang County, 1976 and 1979
*In the absence of population data for the brigades, all calculations were made on an
unweighted basis. The means on these tables were calculated from the distributions;
hence they differ from the actual countywide means. The mean per capita collec-
tively distributed income reported by county officials for 1976 was Y94, and in
1979 Y131. For the distributions in Table 4, &dquo;more than Y150&dquo; was taken arbi-
trarily to be Y160. For the 1979 distribution in Table 3 and both in Table 4, the
midpoints of the income categories were used in calculation.
Figure 3: Lorenz Curve of Category Distribution of Average Annual Per Capita
Collectively Distributed Income in All Brigades of Xiyang County, 1976
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Figure 4: Lorenz Curve of Category Distribution of Average Annual Per Capita
Collectively Distributed Income in All Brigades of Xiyang County, 1979
1980. But the peasants in Xiyang received only Y9.3 per capita
(7.1 % of the collective figure) from family sideline occupations. In
comparison, a sample survey of 700 households in Sichuan shows
that the per capita income from family sideline occupations in
1979 was Y76.7,~ while a nationwide sample survey of 10,282
households puts the per capita net income from household side-
line occupations in 1979 at Y44.0 (Renmin ribao, January 3, 1981 :
1).29 In any case, Xiyang suffered from a serious drought in 1980,
and agricultural production would probably decline. But the
county authorities still hoped that the development of various
kinds of brigade enterprises, a more diversified economy, and
sideline production would keep the decline in the peasants’ in-
come to a minimum.
Tables 3 and 4 are difficult to interpret from the point of view of
the effect on income distribution of the removal of the Y 1. 30
upper limit on the workday value which had been imposed on all
brigades except Dazhai, the return of many small enterprises to the
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brigades, and the freedom given to brigades to develop new small
enterprises. The Gini coefficients for the distributions of average
annual collectively distributed income per capita show no change
from 1976 to 1979, while those for workday values rose from .075
to. 10, a change which is small in absolute terms but actually quite
large in percentage terms.30 Although the data tend somewhat in
the direction we would expect-toward indicating increased
income inequality-it is probably premature to use them to judge
the effects on income distribution among brigades of these policy
changes (specifically, those relating to the brigade enterprises
and the limit on distributed income) which had been in effect in
an overwhelming majority of the brigades for only one of the
years in our data series. We would expect the cumulative effects of
these policies over at least their initial years to result in increased
economic inequality among brigades. One dramatic example has
already appeared. Shiping brigade, which recovered the respon-
sibility for its coal mine from the commune level, was one of only
two units in Xiyang to achieve a workday value of Y2.00 in 1979.
THE PARTY RENDERS ITS FINAL JUDGMENT ON DAZHAI,
AND XIYANG LOOKS AHEAD
From December 9 to 13, 1980, the Party committee of Shanxi
province held a meeting of Party representatives to elect the
province’s delegates to the prospective Twelfth Party Congress.
To prepare a list of candidates, an enlarged meeting of the
standing committee of the provincial Party committee was held in
August and was followed by an enlarged meeting of standing
committees of the Party committees of all the districts, cities, and
counties. At both meetings, an overwhelming majority of those
present refused to nominate Chen Yonggui as a candidate.
In the meeting of the Party representatives in December, the
Party leadership of the province explained to those assembled
that to nominate Chen as a candidate for election would express
the Party’s consistent spirit of &dquo;learning from the past mistakes to
avoid future ones.&dquo; It also noted that recently he had understood
his mistake and made a self-examination. Apparently, he was
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nominated as a candidate but failed to be elected (Tian Beizhi,
1981: 20-21).
In the same month, an election of a new Party committee of the
Dazhai Party branch took place, using the new system of secret
ballots with more candidates than the number of persons to be
elected. The nine candidates had been selected earlier by a general
meeting of the Party branch from names suggested by individual
Party members. Chen had been nominated as one of the nine
candidates, but he lost in the final election. Jia Changsuo, who
had been dismissed by Chen in 1979 but rehabilitated in 1980 and
had been nominated unanimously, was elected the new secretary
(Zhang Jinxing and Jin Jiasheng, 1981: 21-22). The new Party
committee of seven now consists of four new members and three
former members. The reason given for Chen’s failure to be elected
was that he had not made a self-criticism to the people at Dazhai
(FBIS, April 16, 1981: R4).
On February 12, Renmin ribao made public the final judgment
of the Party on Dazhai and the movement to learn from Dazhai in
Shanxi and throughout the nation, which took the form of a
commentary on the self-criticism of the provincial Party committee
of Shanxi.31 The Party Center affirmed that prior to the Cultural
Revolution Dazhai had indeed been an advanced model on the
agricultural front. But it stressed the point that since the
beginning of the Cultural Revolution, it had become the model of
implementing the &dquo;leftist line&dquo; and that the movement to learn
from Dazhai had brought about serious consequences. The self-
criticism of the provincial Party committee specifically defined
this &dquo;leftist line&dquo; of Dazhai and Xiyang as &dquo;so-called firmly
upholding the continued revolution under the dictatorship of the
proletariat.&dquo; For our purposes the most relevant points made in
the attack on Dazhai are: (1) Models should not be established
artificially or maintained through deceptive methods. (2) Many
different kinds of models should be discovered and cultivated in
the light of the variations in China’s countryside. (3) Any
advanced technique and managerial method must be linked to
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the economic interests of the local peasants, must produce
economic results, and must be accepted voluntarily by them.
Meanwhile, from August 1980 onward, the Xiyang county
authorities had been trying to push forward the adoption and
refinement of the responsibility system. Initially, they had
recognized the defects of the system of &dquo;four specifications and
one bonus&dquo; in its present form. Some teams had 80 households.
They were regarded as still too large. They could, the officials
thought, be reduced in size by half and further be divided into
work groups of about ten households each. Within the work
group, several households could sign a production contract and
retain all produce above the quota stipulated in the contract. The
guiding idea was that the more specific and concrete the system of
responsibility, the better. Officials pointed to Zhujiazhuang work
group as an example of success in applying this principle. They
were pushing for the system under which all above-target yields
would belong to a team or work group. In the distribution of
rewards by the team to individual farm workers, the defect in the
system of giving work points according to fixed quotas of
encouraging the neglect of quality of work was recognized. The
cadres were planning to replace it gradually with the system of
lianxi chanliang jichou. But the officials stopped short of
advocating the system of contract work by individual households
(baochan daohu) which is being used in 20% of the teams in the
nation and is practiced by 40% of the households in one
subdistrict in a rural area of Luoshan city in Sichuan (Interview in
August 1980) and more than 70% of the teams in Funan county in
Anhui (Renmin ribao, January 23, 1981: 2). This contrast be-
tween the policies of Xiyang county and Luoshan city in Sichuan
reflects their respective residential patterns. Except in moun-
tainous areas like Mengshan brigade or some places in Xizhai,
the peasants in Xiyang have traditionally lived in village settle-
ments. The movement to build new villages after the fashion
of Dazhai has made the villages even more tightly knit than
before. In Sichuan, the houses of peasants are more scattered. In
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hilly areas, single households or tiny groupings of two or three
households may exist at quite a distance from each other and
from other settlements. The contrast between Xiyang and Funan
arises from the utter poverty and backwardness of Funan and
its inadequate leadership and management system.
In spite of all these changes, county officials were still trying to
strengthen the brigades by supporting the development of brigade
enterprises and sideline occupations. They were still underscoring
the indispensable function of the brigades and communes in
water conservancy, irrigation work, small industrial enterprises,
sideline production, and other undertakings which cannot be
initiated and managed by the teams.
County officials realistically acknowledged that grain produc-
tion in Xiyang would soon reach an upper limit even if the
changes in institutions and practices brought about desirable
results. They would be satisfied if they could achieve an annual
grain production of 280,000,000 jin to 300,000,000 jin and keep it
at that level.32 Meanwhile, they planned to diversify Xiyang’s
economy, reduce the amount of land devoted to grain in order to
develop forestry and animal husbandry, and change the composi-
tion of grain produced by increasing wheat and soybean cultiva-
tion and cutting down on maize. Above all, they wanted to give
the peasants time to rest and recuperate from too many demands
and restrictions imposed by cadres of the brigade, the commune,
and the county. They hoped that by allowing them greater
freedom of choice and by providing greater economic incentives,
the peasants would become rich through individual effort or by
the common endeavor of close-knit units much smaller than the
current brigades or even teams.
Since then, plans of the county authorities as well as their
endeavor to keep in step with the Party Center have resulted in
further changes. A dispatch from Taiyuan published on April 15,
1981 suggested that by this time, 86.8% of the production teams in
Xiyang had adopted one or another form of the system of
responsibility. Of these, 35% had adopted the system of dividing a
team into work groups and linking the incomes of the groups to
their yields, although the brigade remains the basic unit of
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account. Thirty-eight percent had adopted the system of linking
the incomes of the teams to their yields. Two percent had adopted
the system of linking the reward for an individual farmer to yield.
One hundred ninety-two households living in remote hilly areas
had adopted the &dquo;household responsibility system&dquo; (baochan
daohu).33 Initial steps had been taken to implement the sys-
tem of &dquo;contract work for specialized tasks.&dquo; More important
politically is the high praise that the commentator of Renmin
ribao (April 15, 1981: 1) paid to Xiyang county under the
leadership of its new Party committee in breaking the leftist
ideological and political fetters of the past and in achieving another
&dquo;liberation.&dquo; The new Party committee was credited for drawing a
line between the errors committed by &dquo;individual leaders&dquo; and the
actions of the other cadres and the masses, thus protecting the
activism of the latter and encouraging them to continue to work
in the spirit of hard struggle. This transformation was held up as
an example to other localities where the cadres were still
&dquo;poisoned&dquo; by leftist ideas. Thus, Xiyang has redeemed itself in
the eyes of the Party Center.
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE : CENTRALIZED POLITICAL
CONTROL EGALITARIANISM, AND BUREAUCRACY
Our survey suggests that the evolution of the responsibility
system is the product of the endeavor of the Party authorities at
all levels to adjust the system of collective economy as it has
developed since 1956 to the immediate interests and spontaneous
demands of the peasants. In so doing, they have revived and
expanded some of the practices adopted during the three years of
agricultural crisis and during the initial phase of the cooperativi-
zation movement in 1953-1955. They have also developed some
new forms, such as lianchan daolao zeren zhi (also known as
tongyi jingying, lianchan daolao) and zhuanye chengbao, lianchan
jichou. This readjustment can be viewed from two different
perspectives. In one respect, it represents an endeavor to solve the
&dquo;free ride&dquo; problem and the crisis of motivation which had
developed in the system of collective economy and was aggravated
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by the movement to learn from Dazhai. The value and limits of
these institutional changes as measures to spur agricultural
growth we shall leave to the future.
These recent reforms, together with the development of rural
institutions and practices since 1953, can also be examined as a
problem of continuity and change. We wish to suggest the
following approach to this problem of historical interpretation.
From this point of view, rural society in imperial China can be
viewed as having been organized by two institutional arrange-
ments : first, a top-to-bottom control by a centralized bureaucracy
down to the level of the county; and second, a system of
precapitalist &dquo;free enterprise&dquo; at the local level. As Philip Kuhn
notes (1981: 1-17), the &dquo;gentry society&dquo; of the late imperial period
lacked the support of effective concepts of immanence and
representation. It &dquo;could generate little more than a pallid
parochialism&dquo; in view of the immense power of the state and the
weakness of a traditional local community autonomy in the sense
of local areas generating a truly powerful stratum of indigenous
leadership.
Under the post-1949 Chinese state, centralized political con-
trol not only penetrated downward to the grass roots but also
extended horizontally to the economy and other aspects of social
life. The total crisis which engulfed Chinese society and its
relations with foreign powers in the first half of the twentieth
century rendered the rebuilding of a strong, centralized state and
bureaucratic system necessary, or at least made it seem acceptable
to many Chinese. It predisposed some Chinese intellectuals to
accept Marxism, which is a theory of total crisis. It legitimized the
endeavor to make a social revolution which would destroy the
traditional class structure; bring about a redistribution of income;
reshape social institutions; industrialize the country and modernize
its culture and change people’s ideas, attitudes, and habits. A
strongly centralized Party state with a planned economy com-
manding and centrally directing numerous collective economic
units emerged. In the rural areas, the communes staffed by
officials appointed from above and receiving salary from the state
became both political and production units. The brigades and
teams below them were penetrated by Party branches, Party
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small groups, or Party activists. The central places at the lowest
level in the natural system increasingly assumed the character
of administrative and political units performing tasks assigned
from above. Bureaucratic control overwhelmed spontaneous
economic activities.
During the Cultural Revolution, the fractionalization of the
Leninist Party at the national summit, the initial destruction of
the system of Party committees and governmental units below the
Central Committee, and the decreased capability of the rebuilt
Party and governmental organs did not weaken the centralizing
impulse. Indeed, the impulse found even fuller expression in the
leftist revolutionary ideological and political line initiated by
Mao and carried to the extreme by the &dquo;Gang of Four&dquo; with the
support of mobilized and aroused masses-at least for a time.
The idea of the primacy of politics and the practice of organiza-
tional control and mass mobilization were pushed as far as
humanly possible. The limited sphere of precapitalist free enter-
prise in both rural and urban areas which had survived up to this
time shrank still further. It was attacked as a &dquo;spontaneous
tendency toward capitalism&dquo; rather than regarded as a survival of
precapitalist free enterprise which had developed over centuries.
It was not considered a necessary supplement to the farming
activities of the peasants in eking out a living under a collective
economy in the countryside or to the socialist economy in the
cities.
In the countryside, the movement to learn from Dazhai and to
build Dazhai-type counties marked the culmination of this trend.
The use of a single national model for developing agriculture and
organizing rural life was a concrete expression of the centralizing
impulse which had been inherent in the political organization of
the Chinese Empire but was checked by the economic structure of
precapitalist free enterprise at the local level, the technological
backwardness of transportation and communications, and the
size and diversity of China. Thus, the trend toward centralization,
uniformity, and standardization in the performance of all
functions and in a program to reshape socioeconomic institutions
was pushed forward by a mass political movement led by an
apotheosized supreme leader. At the national level, it encountered
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nothing more than ingenious attempts to prevent it from going to
the extreme, endeavors to evade its full impact in the process of
implementation, concealed opposition, and hidden dissent. At
the local level, however, it met extensive evasion and passive
resistance.
But the program to eliminate the remnants of precapitalist free
enterprise through a mass political movement in a short time was
bound to fail, and the endeavor to use one model ran directly
counter to the wide variation in geographical conditions through-
out the vast expanse of China, in the traditional pattern of village
life, and in the capability of the political organization and
leadership in numerous local units of production and governance.
Hence, the movement to learn from Dazhai did not bring about
the desired result in vast areas of China where conditions were
very different from those in Dazhai. It stifled individual initiative.
It did not enable the local units to cope with problems specific to
them or with newly emergent problems in time. It hindered the
effort to improve agricultural productivity and to raise the
peasants’ living standards.
In the national context of rejecting Mao’s ideological and
political line of the Cultural Revolution period, the repudiation
of both the movement to learn from Dazhai and the post-1966
developments in Dazhai itself marked a reversal of the strong and
accelerating trend toward centralization in twentieth-century
China, a reversal of the tendency for politics in the form of mass
political movements and bureaucratic control to penetrate to the
lowest level of society for the purpose of restricting or eliminating
what had remained of precapitalist free enterprise in the country-
side. The reversal of this tendency and the rehabilitation of some
types of precapitalist free enterprise are nowhere more obvious
than in the encouragement of household sideline occupations, the
protection and enlargement of private plots, and the revival of
the rural markets. But the changes go much farther and deeper.
The most fundamental change can be found in the promotion and
perfection of the system of responsibility in agricultural produc-
tion, which we have described in this article. The regime has now
gone as far as it can in readopting some of the traditional forms of
relations of production and farming practices short of a reversion
of land and collectively owned means of production to private
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ownership. It attempts to effect a synthesis of the new insti-
tutions and practices adopted since the nationwide movement
to organize cooperatives in 1955-1956 with some of the traditional
institutions and practices of individual farming. To enable the
production team to make these institutional changes in light of its
specific circumstances, the idea of autonomy of the team has been
underscored and propagated. The reversal of the trend toward
increasing centralized political control also finds expression in
the provinces, municipalities, and counties and the policy of
devolving many more functions to them.
A similar approach can be applied to understand the drive
toward egalitarianism in the countryside. It is common knowledge
that in the revolutionary process the peasants constituted the
major force. Egalitarianism in economic matters was a central
feature in traditional peasant rebellions which have been con-
sidered by the Chinese Communists as the antecedents of their
revolution in a different stage of historical development. To be
sure, Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders drew a sharp
distinction between &dquo;agrarian socialism&dquo; and &dquo;scientific socialism&dquo;
or between &dquo;populism&dquo; and Marxism (for example see Gong
Yuzhi, 1981a, 1981b). They rejected &dquo;absolute egalitarianism&dquo; or
&dquo;extreme egalitarianism&dquo; which characterized the economic
program of traditional peasant rebellions. But as the early
pronouncements on the communization program, many develop-
ments in the Cultural Revolution culminating in the call for the
restriction of &dquo;bourgeois right,&dquo; and the movement to learn from
Dazhai show, the search for a greater degree of economic equality
was a major impetus to continued radical transformation in the
countryside as well as its justification.
In their attempt to find the social basis for the Cultural
Revolution and the leftist errors in policies since 1957, several
Chinese intellectuals trace radical egalitarianism to China’s
&dquo;small producers,&dquo; particularly the peasants. They call for a new
effort to eliminate &dquo;peasant ideology&dquo; (Wang Xiaoqiang, 1980;
Luo Hanxian, 1980). That this line of analysis may have serious
and harmful political and social consequences has been noted
elsewhere (Tsou, Blecher, and Meisner, 1981). Here we suggest
that it is also incorrect-or at least incomplete-in its understand-
ing of the peasants and China’s rural society. It also does not help
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us to understand current developments. If it is true that the rural
economy of traditional China can be characterized as a system of
precapitalist free-enterprise, the kind of sharing which occurred
within the family, the kinship group, the clan, or, to some extent,
the village community was very different from the extreme form
of egalitarianism which flared up during the peasant rebellions.
This radical egalitarianism was nothing less than reaction against
the economic inequality produced in the countryside by precapi-
talist free enterprise. In normal times, the traditional peasants as
&dquo;small producers&dquo; were skillful entrepreneurs rather than extreme
egalitarians. The &dquo;man from Dazhai,&dquo; Chen Yonggui himself, was
directly quoted to have said: &dquo;Only when the peasants are pushed
or dragged will they take the socialist road. If left alone, where
will they go? Once you relax a little, they will slip toward capital-
ism&dquo; (Renmin ribao, July 9, 1981: 2) Chen’s analysis is not too far
from the truth.
Hence, the extreme egalitarianism which is now condemned by
some intellectuals as a natural trait of the peasants was actually a
product of the Chinese revolution, which combined elements from
the traditional peasant rebellions and modern socialism. The
recent revival of many traditional practices in the countryside and
adoption of the responsibility system in an attempt to meet the
felt needs and spontaneous demands of the peasants are them-
selves recognition that the peasantry as a whole does not form the
social basis of extreme egalitarianism. They also mark the end of
the Chinese revolution in the countryside and its replacement by a
program of economic development through the use of some of the
practices of the system of precapitalist free enterprise. But this
revival is taking place within the context of a new ideology,
political order, and economic system. If the regime’s rural policy
succeeds, the relations of production will not revert to the
traditional system of individual farming, nor will they develop
into commercialized agriculture in a capitalist form. It will be a
curious mixture of a modern collective economy and some of the
surviving features of precapitalist free enterprise in the country-
side. This may represent the Chinese path to modernization in
agriculture in the near future. Although &dquo;agrarian socialism&dquo; is
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now under strong attack as incompatible with &dquo;scientific social-
ism,&dquo; it is possible that in the long run a synthesis of these two
strands of thought will emerge and represent a creative response
to the challenge of modernizing agriculture in China. For
egalitarianism was not only rooted in some strands of the Chinese
tradition (this point is made in Wang Xiaoqiang, 1980). It is also a
modern ideal. The combination of growth with equality is a
particularly urgent and inescapable task in a very poor country
with a high population-land ratio.
Following a similar line of thinking, we can briefly look at the
problem of bureaucratic control in the countryside. During the
period of civil and foreign wars, the Party developed not only a
mass movement but also a huge bureaucracy. After the victory
and through the movements of land reform, cooperativization,
and communization, the fighters, activists, and cadres of peasant
origin or from small towns and cities in the rural areas staffed
the bureaucracy at the levels of the county, commune, and
brigade. Indeed, these former peasant rebels and cadres with rural
roots led successive mass movements in transforming the country-
side in the direction of a greater degree of economic egalitarian-
ism. These mass movements and the elevation of the collective
economy to a progressively higher level gave these cadres
increasingly great power of control. Their power interests as local
leaders and bureaucrats who ran the collective economy must be
added to their role as loyal revolutionary Party members as an
explanation of the extraordinary pace of the cooperatization
movement after 1955 and the excesses in the communization
movement. On various occasions Mao undoubtedly wanted to
put the responsibility for excesses on the local cadres; there may
have been an element of justice in this.
The Cultural Revolution was an attack on the bureaucracy.
But the Cultural Revolution itself brought into existence a
factional bureaucracy which paralyzed but did not totally destroy
the preexisting bureaucratic system. The Dazhai movement
increased the control of the leaders at the county, commune, and
brigade levels over the production teams and individual peasants.
It is probably significant and revealing that the first published
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self-criticism made by Xiyang county occurred after the Party
Center sent down a document on the &dquo;experience in Xiangxiang
county&dquo; in Hunan which denounced the practice of upper-level
units in using the labor power, funds, and material resources of
the production teams without compensation as well as the
enormous increase in nonproductive personnel, work, and expen-
diture (Renmin ribao, July 5, 1981: 7; Xiyang’s self-criticism was
published on July 21). Shortly thereafter, the Party published
another document which condemned the practices of cadres of
Xunyi county in maltreating the peasants. Such treatment was
frequently the result of cadres trying to prevent the peasants from
engaging in selling household sideline products in the rural
markets or in other private activities for personal gain (Tsou,
Blecher, and Meisner, 1981: 276). Chen Yonggui’s leadership
style and cadre policy after his seizure of power in Xiyang in 1967
show that even poor and formerly oppressed peasants at the
bottom of China’s bureaucratic society could consciously or
unconsciously take over the political style of the traditional ruling
class and succumb to some of the traditional abuses of power
after they have risen to positions of authority in a revolution, even
if they are simultaneously pushing forward revolutionary, egali-
tarian, and leftist socioeconomic programs which benefit poor
peasants.
Recent changes in the institutions, policies, and practices in the
countryside entail a reduction of bureaucratic control and a
diminution of local cadres’ power. In the context of the acquisi-
tion by the peasants, work groups, and production teams of a
greater degree of autonomy in managing their own economic
affairs, the new system of election with secret ballots and more
candidates than positions to be filled may contribute to the
development and strengthening of a sense of representation, a
new stratum of indigenous leaders, and a tradition of local
autonomy. Whether or not this will be the case, there is no doubt
that these changes and the current emphasis on the need to adjust
institutions, policies, and practices to variations in local condi-
tions will make China’s economy, society, and politics much more
complex than at any time in its long history. China’s fate will
hinge on the success or failure of the endeavor to combine this
complex system with the goals of political unity and stability and








































1. There have been proposals for dismantling the commune system. For example, an
article in Jingji guanli (1981, no. 1: 10-13) suggests that the present system of "three-level
ownership with the team as the basic unit of account" be abandoned and that the
production teams be changed into independent agricultural producers’ cooperatives-a
system used in the period between 1953 and 1956.
2. Article by An Gang et al. in Renmin ribao, July 9, 1981, page 2. An Gang is a
deputy editor of the newspaper.
3. This draft has not been published in China in the newspapers or journals surveyed
by us.
In his excellent and immensely detailed study, Frederick Crook (1971: 202) translates
the term baogong and baochan respectively as "labor contract" and "production
contract."
4. In this article the term "district" rather than "prefecture" is used to translate the
Chinese term diqu.
5. Before and after the two conferences on agriculture in November and December
1977, Deng Xiaoping twice suggested the revival of the various rural policies proven
effective in the past, and pointed out that the Dazhai method of awarding work points
could not be popularized and applied everywhere. The election of Chen Yun as a vice-
chairman of the Party at the Third Plenum made him the most powerful leader in
managing China’s economic affairs.
6. Banyue tan, no. 8 (April 25, 1981: 4-10). See also Zhonggong yanjiu (March 15,
1981: 110-118). The adoption of this document was immediately followed by the
appearance of an editorial in Nongcun gongzuo tongxun 1980, no. 10, and many articles in
that journal and two other journals specializing in agriculture&mdash;Nongye jingji wenti and
Nongye zhishi.
7. In the summer of 1980, many teams in Sichuan had already allocated more than
10% of their cultivated land for private plots (Interview in August 1980).
8. The circular allows persons with half-labor power or supplementary labor power
to be ziliu ren except during busy agricultural seasons, whereas the report did not mention
these restrictions.
9. According to one account, there are more than ten forms of the "responsibility
system" (Renmin ribao, editorial, November 1, 1980: 1).
10. Chinese economists and reporters generally classify the responsibility system by
using the presence or absence of linkage between reward and yield as the primary critenon.
They divide it first into two major categories: One does not link responsibility to yield (bu
lianxi chanliang de shengchan zeren zhi) and the other does (lianxi chanliang de
shengchan zeren zhi). See the excellent article by Wang Guichen and Wei Daonan in Jingji
Yanjiu, 1981, no. 1, pages 64-67, and the important article by Wu Xiang in Renmin ribao,
November 5, 1980, page 2. Instead, we use the level of devolution of responsibility as the
primary criterion and the absence or presence of reward-yield linkage as the secondary
criterion. Our classification facilitates description of the evolution of the responsibility
system and highlights the political problem of the relationship between state and
household or individual, while the classificatory scheme used in China calls attention to
the economic significance of the change, particularly the role of material incentive.
11. Prior to adoption of the system of self-assessment and public discussion (zibao
gongyi) from 1961 to 1963, there had been 130 to 140 work quotas in Dazhai.
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12. Although "piecework" is the common term applied to the fixed work quota
system, in some cases the system might better be called "task rate" since the sizes of
individual jobs and time required are relatively great. Compare this to the familiar factory
or home-industry piecework in which a worker turns out hundreds of small items in a day,
usually the same thing (especially in piece-goods work in the garment industry). Moving
cartloads of manure may more appropriately be called piecework.
13. Although the Chinese writers subsumed this form of labor management under the
category of responsibility system without reward-output linkage, the use of the work point
system in itself establishes a remote linkage between performance and reward because the
value of the work point is decided only at the end of the year after the harvest, and it
fluctuates with the harvest.
14. The four specifications usually include task, quality standard, time limit, and the
work points to be received in exchange. See article by Wang Gengjin and He Jianzhang,
Jingji yanjiu, 1978, no. 8, page 18. The provincial authorities in Anhui were among the first
to approve this system.
15. This form is classified in China under the category of responsibility system without
reward-output linkage.
16. This subtype and all other types of labor management discussed hereafter are
classified by Chinese writers as forms of responsibility system with reward-output linkage.
17. In granting this permission, the documents used the term ye keyi after it gave clear
permission (keyi) to the system of awarding work points according to work quotas and the
system of time work plus appraisal of work done. Thereafter a debate arose at the local
level in some areas. One side argued that the best formula was keyi, keyi, geng keyi (is
permitted, is permitted, and is all the more permitted). The other side, consisting of the
opponents to change, argued that the policy should be keyi, keyi, bu keyi (is permitted, is
permitted, and is not permitted) (Renmin ribao, December 24, 1980: 2). Obviously, the
proponents of change had won. Moreover, the system of responsibility had by that time
extended to the level of a single household and an individual, as we shall see.
18. An article in Honggi expresses reservations about this system. The author fears
that it may destroy the system of unified accounting and unified distribution of rewards.
He asserts that it should not be classified, without careful examination of its various forms
and effects, as one type of "responsibility system." Article by Yu Gudyao, Hongqi, 1980,
no. 20, pages 12-15, 35.
19. The decision on accelerating agricultural development adopted in September 1979
gave permission to employ this system only among single households living in remote hilly
areas and where the special needs of certain kinds of sideline production made it desirable.
20. The Xinhua correspondents also contrasted the rapid adoption of this system to
the difficulties encountered by the authorities in introducing the Dazhai system of
distributing rewards.
21. The ratio between labor and land in this team is low in comparison with many
parts of China. Note that a yield per worker of 6,500 jin per year is equivalent to 542 jin per
month. If the worker is able to double the rather low output of 168 jin per mu that the
quota calls for, the resultant surplus retained is equivalent to a substantial monthly grain
ration (kouliang). If the worker could attain yields surpassing 500 jin per mu, he or she
would receive a high monthly grain ration plusaround Y60 in cash (figuring 542 additional
jin per month at about Y0.11 per jin). But these yields may not be possible.
22. In Jiangxi, this system is called the "assignment of responsibility for field
management to a farm worker and linkage of rewards and bonuses to yields" (Renmin
ribao, March 13, 1981: 2).
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23. The work groups, households, and individual farm workers who undertake
specialized tasks are known respectively as zhuanye zu, zhuanye hu, and zhuanye ren.
24. For use of this system in other localities, see Renmin ribao, April 19,1981; page 1;
May 8, 1981, page 2. Leshan, Sichuan also uses this system. In one case, two cadres of the
county were assigned to a team. They were promised a bonus if the production of this team
increased (Interview in Leshan, Sichuan, 1980). Some localities in Henan adopted a
system under which the subsidies given to cadres will be increased 1% if the net income of
the brigades and teams increases 1%; they will be decreased 1% if the net income decreases
by 1% (Renmin ribao, August 11, 1981: 2).
25. For Premier Zhao Ziyang’s view, see article in Liaowang, 1981, no. 2, pages 2-5.
For the latest reports, see articles in Renmin ribao August 22, 1981, page 2 and September
1, 1981, page 2, and articles in Nongye jingji wenti, 1981, no. 6, pages 9-13, 13-17.
26. Mr. Gao Xiubao, a deputy secretary, told Tsou in an interview that even in May
and June the Party committee was unwilling to implement fully the decision of the Third
Plenum and to criticize ultra-leftist policies and ideas.
27. In Shanxi, in 1980, there were 120,000 production teams. Of these, 39.8% had
adopted the system of awarding work points according to fixed work quotas for a series of
related tasks to be performed over a period of time. In the rest, the teams were divided into
work groups and the system of fixing an output quota for each work group was used,
locally called lianchan daozu.
28. The officials in Sichuan who gave Tsou these figures noted that this sample was
not representative, in that the per capita income from collective sources was Y95.4, far
above the Y80.1 for the province as a whole. But they insisted that the per capita income
from family sideline occupations was a little more representative.
29. This sample survey puts the net per capita income of peasants from the collective
units at Y102, which is much higher than the figure of Y83.4 given in the communique of
the State Bureau of Statistics.
30. To be sure, there are statistical problems in manipulating the data. Distortions
may result from the use of midpoints of income range categories. The large category of
Y100 to Y149 given in the 1976 data may in fact overstate the level of inequality in the
distribution. The assumption that the highest open-ended categories in Table 4 had a mean
of Y 160 is arbitrary. Nevertheless, we believe these problems are relatively minor; it is hard
for us to imagine a situation under which they could be concealing conceptually significant
differences between the levels of inequality in the 1976 and 1979 situations.
31. For a fuller discussion, see Tsou, Blecher, and Meisner (1981: 301-304).
32. The highest yield ever achieved in Xiyang was 271,960,000 jin in 1979, when the
weather was good and the state raised its prices for grain.
33. The first secretary of the Shaanxi Party committee, Huo Shilian, had expressed his
approval of boachan daohu in his inspection trip to one county in Shanxi in March
(Renmin ribao, March 26, 1981: 1).
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